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Vertical Disintegration in the European Electricity Sector:  
Empirical Evidence on Lost Synergies 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The EU has been promoting unbundling of the transmission grid from other stages of the electricity 
supply chain with the aim of fostering competition in the upstream stage of electricity generation. At present, 
ownership unbundling is the predominant form of unbundling in Europe. From a policy perspective, a successful 
unbundling regime would require that the benefits of increased competition in power generation would at least 
offset the associated efficiency losses from vertical divestiture. Since evidence on this topic is scarce, this study 
helps fill this void by empirically estimating the magnitude of economies of vertical integration (EVI) between 
electricity generation and transmission based on a quadratic cost function. For this purpose we employ unique 
firm-level panel data of European electricity utilities. Our results confirm the presence of substantial EVI of 14% 
for the median sized integrated utility. Moreover, EVI tend to increase with firm size. 
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1. Introduction 
Before the introduction of liberalization and regulatory reforms in order to promote competition 
in the European electricity sector, electricity utilities were generally regarded as vertically 
integrated natural monopolies. In the classical fashion, vertical integration of upstream and 
downstream operations was the predominant organizational form of an electricity utility to 
benefit from scope economies of vertical integration (EVI). A fully vertically integrated 
electricity company would encompass all stages from electricity generation to high-voltage 
transmission of electricity and local distribution, in conjunction with system operations, 
retailing to final consumers, and wholesale power procurement (e.g. Hunt, 2002). It seems 
natural that vertical integration exhibits cost savings through coordination advantages, sharing 
of information, use of common inputs, sharing of staff, efficient planning of investments, 
protection against uncertainty and financial risk, among other factors, which cannot be easily 
realized by unbundled firms (Jara-Díaz et al., 2004; Meyer, 2012).  
Electricity is a particularly special good which includes some important characteristics: (i) On 
a large scale, electricity cannot be easily stored, which requires supply to meet demand at all 
times. Therefore, suppliers need to have sufficient excess capacities to meet peak demand. (ii) 
Electricity follows physical laws (Ohm’s and Kirchoff’s laws) and flows its way of least 
resistance. (iii) Usually, generated electricity has to be transported to customers via long-
distance high-voltage transmission lines and locally via lower-voltage distribution lines 
(Arocena et al., 2012; Ramos-Real, 2005). Under these conditions, the supply of electricity is 
highly interlinked along the various supply stages and, accordingly, subject to coordination 
requirements (Gugler et al., 2013). Hence, vertical integration seems to be a more efficient 
organizational form in electricity compared to leaving the coordination of vertical supply to the 
market (Arocena et al., 2012). 
In recent decades, the unbundling principle (i.e. vertical separation) has been put into practice 
in many economies around the globe. This regulatory measure aims at isolating some segments 
of the electricity supply chain which do not exhibit the usual properties of a natural monopoly 
(e.g. generation, retail) for the sake of eliminating anti-competitive forces and lowering the 
electricity price for end-consumers through increased competition (Fraquelli et al., 2005). The 
remaining segments – the transmission grid and the distribution lines – feature typical network 
characteristics associated with a natural monopoly and, thus, need to be regulated.1 
                                                          
1 For example, by introducing price regulation (grid tariffs) and third party access. 
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However, a controversial debate has arisen whether the benefits of increased competition may 
be offset by potentially increased costs of utilities from unbundling.2 The policy discussion has 
brought little attention to the fact that the regulatory measure of vertical disintegration comes 
at a cost, namely the destruction of vertical economies. According to Meyer (2012a) the greatest 
vertical synergies occur between generation and transmission, for which the largest cost 
savings are to be expected. This is, because coordination needs are particularly pronounced 
between upstream power plants and their direct connection to the downstream transmission 
network (opposed to the indirectly linked distribution network). Against this backdrop, it is 
important to assess if and how large these EVI may be. Lost vertical economies might present 
a significant barrier for an unbundling regime to be successful. 
Indeed, the European Union has already put vertical disintegration of the high-voltage 
transmission grid into practice (starting with the EU directive 1996/92/EC; Schmitt and 
Kucsera, 2014).3 Therefore, vertical structures of electricity utilities have been broken up, and 
simultaneously, third party access to the transmission grid has been granted for entrants. The 
most recent EU directive 2009/72/EC requires its member states to choose from three different 
forms of vertical unbundling of the transmission grid: (i) full ownership unbundling (the 
predominant form in Europe), (ii) the implementation of an independent system operator (ISO), 
or (iii) the implementation of an independent transmission operator (ITO).4 Among them, 
ownership unbundling represents the most restrictive type, where vertically integrated 
electricity utilities have to fully separate from their transmission grid. 
The political discussion about vertical synergies and the unbundling of electricity utilities has, 
of course, not been limited on Europe only; it also has been a controversial topic in the United 
States (Joskow, 2005a) and many other parts of the world (Pollitt, 2008). Common to the 
European as well as to the US electricity sector has been the fact that prior to liberalization, 
both sectors have been characterized by a high degree of vertical integration (Meyer, 2012b). 
However, the structures of the electricity industries and their regulatory frameworks differed 
and still differ in many respects (Joskow, 2005a). The U.S. electricity supply industry for 
instance has been highly fragmented, as it developed from small, local systems that were weakly 
integrated. Consequently, the level of integration among transmission networks has been 
traditionally rather low. At the same time, there has not been an overall and coherent US-wide 
                                                          
2 Sappington (2008) discusses the benefits of vertical divestiture to maximize consumer welfare despite the 
presence of substantial vertical economies. Gugler et al. (2013) show that there is a trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency in this context. 
3 In contrast, the level of unbundling of distribution lines lags far behind. 
4 Balmert and Brunekreeft (2010) provide a description of the various forms of transmission unbundling. 
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regulatory regime in place, since most utilities have been regulated by the individual states’ 
Public Utility Commissions. The Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) has only 
been responsible for utilities that operate across states borders. In contrast, the integration of 
transmission networks as well as the harmonization of regulatory regimes in the European 
Union is more advanced, which is primarily driven by the European Commissions’ policy. 
While the empirical literature in general finds considerable cost savings from vertical 
economies for US electricity utilities, limited empirical literature on single-country studies 
points toward modest cost savings in Europe. In brief, empirical evidence questions the 
effectiveness of the divestiture of integrated utilities in the electricity industry, whereby 
evidence from Europe is scarce and not as distinctive as from the US. Noticeably, not only the 
regulatory framework but also the structure of the electricity industry differ between the US 
and Europe in many respects (as indicated above), which makes a direct comparison difficult 
(Meyer, 2012a). Moreover, the predominant share of the literature concentrates on the 
estimation of scope economies between the stages of generation and distribution, for which 
data seem to be more easily available. In contrast, there is hardly any evidence on cost savings 
from integration between generation and transmission. Since the EU law explicitly requires 
unbundling of the transmission grid, such information would be of utmost relevance. 
A key feature of this study is to concentrate on the efficiency and effectiveness of vertical 
divestiture of the supply stages of generation and transmission of European electricity utilities, 
while most of the literature has focused on distribution unbundling. To achieve this goal, we 
quantify EVI based on the estimation of a multistage quadratic cost function. If vertical 
economies were found to be large, it would indicate that the regulatory measure of ownership 
unbundling of the transmission grid may come at substantial costs. 
We utilize novel firm-level data on 28 major European electricity utilities from 16 European 
countries for the annual date for the period 2000–2010. Data are collected from annual reports 
and combined with data sources from Platts, Orbis, Worldscope, Eurostat and OECD. To the 
best of our knowledge, the paper is the first to provide empirical cross-country evidence for 
Europe regarding economies of scope from vertical integration in the electricity sector. The 
data allow for identifying vertical economies through mixed company structures, since the 
sample represents all organizational forms of generators, transmitters, and vertically integrated 
utilities.  
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We find that vertical integration between generation and transmission is associated with 
significant cost savings. This is of high policy relevance, since this places a non-negligible 
hurdle for an unbundling regime to be successful. For the median sized integrated utility having 
45.5 TWh electricity generation and 5,500 km of lines, EVI are around 14%. Given the 
skewness of the sample, the much larger mean sized integrated utility (i.e. 117.4 TWh electricity 
generation and 14,700 km of lines) obtains EVI in the magnitude of 21%. Hence, there is 
evidence that large operators tend to benefit more from vertical integration. Also, at larger 
scales, variable cost savings tend to be more pronounced compared to fixed cost savings. Our 
results shed some light on the consequences of transmission unbundling as a regulatory means. 
This is of particular interest not only to regulatory authorities and policy-makers who are 
concerned with the optimal form of regulation, but also to end-consumers who eventually have 
to finance the electricity system via electricity taxes and (higher) prices. Moreover, these 
findings are consistent with existing findings regarding the cost increases associated with 
deregulation (unbundling) in other parts of the world, like the US. 
The findings also complement the academic literature as we provide evidence on the 
mechanisms underlying the EVI. We find that asset specificity and market complexity are 
potential sources of vertical cost synergies because they increase the coordination requirements 
between generation and transmission. Specifically, we subject EVI to utilities’ innovativeness 
(patents), increasing penetration from intermittent renewable sources, and market 
fragmentation. We find that EVI are more important for innovative firms, if there is more 
penetration from intermittent renewables, and if market fragmentation is larger. In this context, 
policies to internalize externalities from asset specificity and market complexity are desirable. 
In particular, such policies may foster market forces, target the hold-up risk of sunk costs, try 
to integrate intermittent renewable sources of energy, and enhance the performance of 
institutions in order to meet the inherent coordination needs between generation and 
transmission. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the relevant literature about 
scope economies in the electricity sector. Section 3 describes the theory on scope economies 
and their potential sources. The model specification and estimation strategy are presented in 
Section 4. Section 5 discusses the underlying data for the econometric analysis. The results are 
provided in Section 6, where we present regression results and robustness checks. Section 7 
digs deeper into the sources of economies of vertical integration and analyzes the dimensions 
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of asset specificity and coordination requirements in greater detail. Section 8 summarizes the 
findings and derives policy implications. 
 
2. Review of relevant empirical literature on vertical economies in electricity 
The main body of the empirical literature on vertical economies in the electricity sector 
investigates the stages of generation and the network, where the latter is either represented by 
the distribution network or a combination of the distribution and the transmission network. 
Some early works have concentrated on the separability and sub-additivity of the vertical supply 
stages in the electricity sector (e.g. Gilsdorf, 1994; Hayashi et al. 1997; Lee, 1995; Roberts, 
1986; Thompson, 1997). The findings generally indicate non-separability of the cost function,5 
which points toward the presence of vertical scope economies. Subsequently, empirical studies 
have started to directly implement the concept of multi-output theory with the primary appeal 
to estimate the magnitude of vertical synergies in the electricity markets. Both Arocena et al. 
(2010) and Ramos-Real (2005) provide thorough literature reviews. In the following, we 
discuss the relevant literature on vertical cost synergies in the US and European electricity 
sectors. In doing so, we put emphasis on the stages of generation and distribution, as well as 
generation and transmission. 
A great deal of the empirical nexus on scope economies from vertical integration between 
generation and distribution focuses on the US. The article by Kaserman and Mayo (1991), who 
apply a quadratic cost function and estimate 12 percent cost savings at the sample mean for 74 
US electricity companies in 1981, was a seminal contribution. Hayashi et al. (1997) focus on 
50 US utilities with at least 85 percent of generation from fossil fuels for the period 1983–1987 
and apply a translog cost function. The results show vertical economies of around 17 percent 
for the average utility (a sample split into small and large utilities shows evidence of vertical 
economies of 14 percent and 17 percent, respectively). Kwoka (2002) examines data on 147 
US utilities for the year 1989 and finds substantial vertical economies based on a quadratic cost 
function. While for very small utilities, stand-alone production is a viable strategy, larger 
companies profit from cost savings from vertical integration. At the median and mean level, 
scope economies are calculated at 27 and 42 percent, respectively. Greer (2008) utilizes a 
sample of 831 rural US utilities in 1997. Estimates from a modified quadratic cost function 
                                                          
5 Non-separability of the cost function means that downstream activities of transmission and distribution are 
dependent on upstream generation. 
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reveal cost savings from vertical integration for basically all utilities. Similar to Kwoka’s (2002) 
findings, economies of scope for the average utility are in the order of 40 percent. 
Triebs et al. (2016) apply a flexible approach of the cost function by allowing for differences 
in technologies across integrated and specialized firms. Their results from an unbalanced panel 
of US utilities for the period 2000–2003 indicate moderate scope economies of 4.4 percent, 
putting previous findings into perspective. Arocena et al. (2012) incorporate data on 116 US 
investor-owned utilities for the year 2001 and estimate a quadratic cost function. Vertical 
economies are estimated in the scope of eight percent, while horizontal economies (across 
different types of generation) make up around 5.5 percent for the average utility. 
In contradiction to the pronounced empirical literature on the US electricity industry, the 
European literature on multi-output cost-function estimation of vertical scope economies is 
relatively limited. To the best of our knowledge, there are merely single country studies but no 
cross-country analyses. The Spanish electricity market has been investigated by Jara-Díaz et al. 
(2004), who employ an unbalanced panel of 12 Spanish electricity utilities for 1985–1996. The 
average firm in their sample exhibits vertical economies of 6.5 percent and horizontal 
economies of around ten percent. With regard to Italy, Fraquelli et al. (2005) make use of a 
composite cost function on 25 municipal electric utilities for the period 1994–2000 and estimate 
vertical cost savings of 3 percent. The same dataset is used by Piacenza and Vannoni (2004)6, 
who compare estimates from different cost function specifications (generalized translog, 
standard translog, separable quadratic, composite, and general7). Their preferred model, the 
composite form, yields vertical economies in the magnitude of 6 percent for the median utility. 
Fetz and Filippini (2010) concentrate on the Swiss electricity sector. The estimation of a 
quadratic cost function for 74 utilities over 1997–2005 yields substantial vertical economies far 
beyond 40 percent on average.8 This may be explained by the relatively small size of the sample 
utilities having generally less than 100,000 customers. 
As far as we know, Meyer (2012a) is the only empirical study to investigate scope economies 
between electricity generation and transmission. Based on data from the US for the period 
2001–2008, his findings indicate modest vertical synergies between the two stages of 
approximately four percent for the average firm. This is explained by a coordination effect from 
transaction cost theory: “firm internal coordination is expected to be more efficient than market 
                                                          
6 In contrast to Fraquelli et al. (2005), Piacenza and Vannoni (2009) employ different output measures, with the 
purpose of investigating not only vertical but also horizontal economies at the distribution stage. 
7 The composite and general forms are implemented according to Pulley and Braunstein (1992). 
8 The exact magnitude of vertical economies for the mean or median utility is not provided in the paper. 
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coordination as a result of costly, incomplete and/or inflexible contracts of market participants 
pursuing different or opposing interests” (Meyer, 2012a, 105). Yet, Meyer warns against a 
potential bias of a comparison of his results with findings for Europe because of different 
market structures and initial unbundling conditions9. Besides, his results show the presence of 
vertical economies between generation and the whole network of transmission plus distribution 
of 19 to 26 percent and vertical economies between distribution (including retail) and 
generation plus transmission of eight to ten percent. 
Against this review of the empirical literature, vertical economies of scope in the electricity 
industry appear to exist, whereas contrasting findings regarding the magnitude of estimated cost 
savings from vertical integration may stem from different factors. Among them are: (i) the 
heterogeneity of utilities (e.g. size, corporate form, geographic region, regulatory framework) 
included in the data; (ii) the specification of the cost function; (iii) different measures of outputs 
and inputs; and (iv) diverging periods of observation. Some evidence from US electricity 
markets corroborates the presence of substantial cost savings from vertical integration. Clearly, 
vertical synergies in the European electricity sectors are under-researched, foremost because 
only single countries have been investigated. Overall, the effectiveness of vertical ownership 
unbundling is being questioned despite its potential positive effects (e.g. increased competition, 
lower end-consumer prices). Since European cross-country scrutiny is missing, the purpose of 
this paper is to help fill this void in the literature. 
 
3. Multiproduct theory and sources of vertical economies 
The concept of economies of scope is rooted in the multiproduct production theory which is 
based on the idea that there may be potential cost savings from jointly producing two outputs 
in contrast to producing them separately. Transaction theory provides the explanation that “firm 
internal coordination is expected to be more efficient than market coordination” (Meyer, 2012a, 
105). Consequently, the vertically integrated supply of upstream electricity generation and 
downstream electricity transmission may be more cost-efficient than a separated production 
process, as suggested by transmission ownership unbundling. Hence, vertical scope economies 
are in place if the costs of separating the supply stages of generation (𝑌𝐺) and transmission (𝑌𝑇) 
exceed their combined production costs: 
                                                          
9 In the US, many states have implemented Regional Transmission Operators (RTO), which basically incorporate 
the role of European ISO.  
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𝐶(𝑌𝐺 , 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑌𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑌𝐺 , 𝑌𝑇) > 0. (1) 
The magnitude of economies of vertical integration (EVI) can be measured as the cost savings 
of jointly serving both stages relative to the costs of separated supply (Kwoka, 2002):  
𝐸𝑉𝐼 = [𝐶(𝑌𝐺 , 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑌𝑇) − 𝐶(𝑌𝐺 , 𝑌𝑇)]/[𝐶(𝑌𝐺 , 0) + 𝐶(0, 𝑌𝑇)]. (2) 
By exploiting vertical economies of scope, electricity utilities may obtain benefits for various 
reasons. In general, the complexity of the electricity sector and its interdependency among the 
different supply stages require a high degree of coordination. In particular, integrated utilities 
may reduce their costs by coordinating dispatches of utilities’ plants according to the actual 
merit order10. Those vertical synergies may be lost with transmission unbundling and, hence, 
uncoordinated dispatches may shift costs closer to the more expensive reserve power. Besides 
optimizing economic dispatch of generating plants, Arocena et al. (2012) highlight coordination 
advantages from efficient plant investment, planning of maintenance schedules, maintenance 
of spinning reserves11, and risk management. 
Additionally, Baumol et al. (1982) point out that firms may save on costs by sharing common 
inputs among different stages of operations. It is most likely that electricity utilities may reduce 
costs by sharing capital and labor among the supply stages generation and transmission. 
Additionally, coordination advantages may arise due to technological interdependency of the 
operational stages of electricity supply (Gugler et al., 2013). Immediate coordination is required 
in so far as demand has to meet supply at all times. For this instance, the operational stages of 
electricity supply are interdependent and require informational transactions. “Since the 
strongest interaction occurs between generation and transmission, one would expect the most 
significant synergies between these stages” (Meyer, 2012a, 97). Other synergies may stem from 
sharing common production or maintenance tasks, and from the common usage of buildings, 
administrative staff, or IT software. Another source of vertical synergies may arise from 
efficient planning of investments by sharing accurate information among the various 
operational stages. Given these possibilities for attaining vertical economies of integration, their 
                                                          
10 In order to ensure equality of electricity supply when demand is declining, electricity plants may be dispatched 
from the network according to the merit order, which represents the short-term supply curve of electricity 
production based on ascending order of power plants’ marginal costs. 
11 The spinning reserve is the capacity reserve provided by the generating units actually connected to the power 
grid. In contrast, generating units not connected to the grid contribute to the non-spinning reserve. 
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loss from ownership unbundling of the transmission grid may increase the costs of utilities 
substantially.12 
 
4. Model specification and estimation strategy 
This study incorporates the quadratic specification of the cost function, which has been 
introduced by Baumol et al. (1982) and has since been widely applied for estimating scope 
economies in electricity markets. It provides several advantages over other specifications. 
Firstly, compared to the translog cost function, the quadratic readily handles the zero-values 
problem (Jara-Díaz et al., 2004). In the case of estimating vertical scope economies, this 
problem becomes particularly severe because, by definition, specialized production of one 
output requires zero values for the other output(s).13 However, the quadratic cost function 
represents a second order Taylor approximation of its true unknown form. Hence, its corners 
may be poorly estimated and should be interpreted with caution. Secondly, against the zero 
values problem, the quadratic is regarded as relevant for the estimation of cost savings from 
vertical integration (e.g. Farsi et al., 2008; Farsi and Filippini, 2004) and given its prevalent 
application, results obtained from a quadratic cost function allow for a direct comparison with 
other studies. 
Many other empirical studies on economies of vertical integration base their analyses on the 
estimation of a reduced form of the full specification of the cost function and/or do not impose 
all relevant restrictions (Farsi and Filippini, 2004; Fetz and Filippini, 2010; Kwoka, 2002; 
Meyer, 2012; Nemoto and Goto, 2004). The large estimates of cost synergies in previous papers 
(as mentioned in Section 2) may partly be due to the fact that “the cost function is not 
completely specified, as the input cost-share equations are not estimated together with the cost 
equation, many price interaction terms are excluded, and linear homogeneity restrictions are 
not imposed” (Arocena et al., 2012, 439). 
                                                          
12 Notwithstanding the synergy losses associated with vertical divestiture, Meyer (2012b) argues that firms subject 
to ownership unbundling would restructure their organizational form in order to obtain specialization advantages. 
Moreover, these costs have to be balanced against advantages of potentially increased competition. 
13 Pulley and Braunstein (1992, 223) mention that “(…) the estimated translog cost function cannot be used to 
measure the costs of specialized production, as is required to estimate economies of scope or product-specific 
economies of scale.” Even though some studies (e.g. Hayashi et al., 1997) try to overcome this dilemma by 
replacing zero values by an arbitrarily small value, Triebs et al. (2016) argue that such estimates of scope 
economies may suffer from significant bias. Other functional forms, for example the composite cost function, 
allow for zero values in outputs (Fraquelli et al., 2005) but bear disadvantages, such as highly non-linear 
parameters and no economic meaning of coefficients (Triebs et al., 2016). 
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We therefore estimate the full specification of the cost function, which includes a full set of 
interaction terms between outputs and input prices: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝐺 + 𝛼𝑇 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑗
𝑗 + 0.5 ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑙
𝑙 + 0.5 ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑙𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑚𝑙 +
∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑙𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑗𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑙
𝑙𝑗 + 𝜌
′𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
The subscripts i and t stand for the utility and year, respectively. The dependent variable (𝐶) 
represents the total costs, 𝑌 includes measures for outputs, w stands for measures for input 
prices, Z is a set of cost shifting variables, and ε is the error term. The two outputs of generation 
and transmission are given by 𝑗 = {𝐺, 𝑇}, the three input prices of labor, capital, and fuel are 
given by 𝑙 = {𝐿, 𝐶, 𝐹}. The constants for overall operations, generation-specific operations, and 
transmission-specific operations are represented by 𝛼0, 𝛼𝐺 and𝛼𝑇 , respectively. 
The constant 𝛼0 represents the joint fixed costs of an integrated utility, which operates at both 
stages of generation and transmission. These may arise, for example, from the usage of common 
facilities or common staff. Kwoka (2002, 659) mentions that “𝛼0 represents the costs of any 
indivisible input, costs that would be duplicated by separate production (…).” In contrast, 𝛼𝐺  
and 𝛼𝑇  are fixed costs of stand-alone provision of the supply stages of generation and 
transmission, respectively. The estimated parameter on the output interaction between 
generation and transmission, 𝛽𝐺𝑇, is of particular interest. A negative sign indicates variable 
cost synergies associated with the joint operation of generation and transmission within one 
electricity utility relative to separated operations. 
Sheppard’s Lemma is applied in order to enhance the performance of the regression by 
estimating the cost function together with its input shares (Christensen and Green, 1976).14 This 
imposes no additional parameters but increases the degrees of freedom of the model (Martínez-
Budría et al., 2003). The input shares read as follows: 
𝜕𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑙 = 𝑥𝑙 = 𝛾𝑙 + ∑ 𝛾𝑙𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑚 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑙𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑗
𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑙  (4) 
where 𝑥𝑙 represents the quantity of input 𝑙, and 𝜀
𝑙 is the corresponding error term.  
Moreover, we introduce several restrictions to meet the assumptions of a standard cost function. 
A well-behaved cost function assumes linear homogeneity in input prices, so that an increase 
in input prices proportionally increases total costs. This condition is imposed by dividing total 
                                                          
14 Note that it is necessary to drop the input share equation regarding the input price which is used for normalization 
of costs and input prices. 
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costs and input prices by an arbitrarily chosen input price.15 Furthermore, we assume symmetry 
for the 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝛿  parameters, so that 𝛽𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽𝑘𝑗 , 𝛾𝑙𝑚 = 𝛾𝑚𝑙  and 𝛿𝑗𝑙 = 𝛿𝑙𝑗 . Additionally, we 
assume cost minimization of utilities and that outputs and input prices are determined 
exogenously. For the latter, Arocena et al. (2012) state that: “factor prices are determined in 
competitive markets or through regulation, while electricity output is determined by consumer 
demand” (Arocena et al., 2012, 444). Electricity utilities’ inputs, like capital and fuel (uranium, 
coal, gas, oil) are generally traded internationally, which may support the exogeneity 
assumption.16 
 
5. Data 
This analysis utilizes a novel dataset of European electricity utilities. We focus on major utilities 
in order to ensure some degree of homogeneity. Foremost, contrary to small operators, large 
utilities are more likely to incorporate a transmission grid if vertically integrated. Data are 
collected from the firms’ annual reports and are combined with other sources (Platts, Orbis, 
Worldscope, Eurostat, OECD). Limitations on data availability of relevant variables eventually 
led to the utilization of data from 28 major European electricity utilities from 16 European 
countries for the period 2000–2010.  
The utilities in our sample cover 74 percent in total load of their respective countries.17 Some 
missing values in the data emanate from a lack of information in the respective annual reports 
or from other data sources.18 Hence, the sample is structured as an unbalanced panel. When 
possible and reasonable, single missing observations were inter- or extrapolated.19 Despite 
potential measurement errors in the data, we are quite confident that these do not systematically 
correlate with firm integration of interest (which would systematically bias our estimates). In 
total, the sample comprises 242 observations. Summary statistics for all variables employed in 
                                                          
15 In our case, we divide costs and input prices by the price of fuel. 
16 In contrast, labor is rather nationally determined. Besides, the exogeneity assumption may not hold if, for 
example, large operators may obtain inputs in large amounts at cheaper prices, which might bias our empirical 
estimates in the direction of high EVI. Hence, we ran a robustness regression for a subsample of utilities that have 
shares of generation capacities from fuelless technologies (i.e. wind, solar, hydro) above the mean. Robustness is 
confirmed in so far as the coefficient estimate of the output interaction term is negative and significant. We thank 
an anonymous referee for raising these points. 
17 The comparison is based on OECD data on total national load for the available period 2003–2010: 2003: 69%, 
2004: 70%, 2005: 79%, 2006: 76%, 2007: 75%, 2008: 74%, 2009: 76%, 2010: 74%; Switzerland was excluded 
because of missing data. 
18 Due to missing information regarding our output measures we were not able to include some important utilities 
like E.ON. 
19 Inter- and extrapolations of individual data points make up around 4% in total data points. 
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this analysis are provided in Table 1. 20  The sample includes all organizational company 
structures of pure generators, pure transmission operators, and vertically integrated utilities. 
Appendix Table A1 provides an overview of the electricity utilities covered by the sample. 
5.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, total costs, represents the sum of capital and operating expenditures. 
One particular concern regarding the estimation of multistage cost functions is to avoid any 
potential double-counting of expenses for purchased electricity (e.g. Kwoka, 2002; Jara-Díaz 
et al., 2004; Meyer, 2012). Expenditures for purchased electricity have to be excluded from the 
total costs of utilities, which obtain all or a part of their electricity from external sources. 
Kaserman and Mayo (1991) have neglected to subtract purchased powers from total costs in 
their seminal paper, and have consequently been largely criticized by successive works.21 
Unfortunately, data on expenses on purchased power were largely not available. For that reason, 
we collected data on the amount of purchased power from annual reports of the utilities in our 
sample. The amount of purchased power was then multiplied by the spot market price of 
electricity, obtained from the European Energy Exchange for the respective years. This made it 
possible to exclude purchased power from total costs.22 
5.2. Output variables 
The upstream generation output is measured as the amount of electricity (in TWh). Even though 
some utilities operate at the national level only, others possess generation plants across 
countries. If an electricity utility is found to operate overseas (outside Europe), it was generally 
possible to obtain the amount of electricity produced in Europe. 
                                                          
20 The variables 𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑, 1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼 and 𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙 will be explained in more detail in Section 5, where we 
investigate the potential sources of vertical economies of scope. 
21 See Kwoka (2002, 659f) for a discussion. 
22 To check for robustness, we ran all regressions presented in this paper without subtracting purchased power 
from total costs. Regression results hardly changed. This is especially true for the parameter of interest on the 
output interaction term (𝛽𝐺𝑇). Hence, the exclusion of purchased power seems less problematic in our analysis 
than in other studies. One explanation may be that we focus on transmission unbundling, whereas the main body 
of the literature concentrates on distribution unbundling. 
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Table 1. Sample statistics 
Description Variable Main sources Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable               
TOTEX excl. purchased power (htEUR) 𝐶 
Worldscope; Orbis; 
Annual reports 
242 73.61 118.83 1.20 578.98 
Outputs              
Generation (TWh) 𝑌𝐺  Annual reports 242 74.80 136.85 0.00 669.00 
Transmission (tKm) 𝑌𝑇 Annual reports 242 9.80 21.65 0.00 100.69 
Input prices              
Price of labor (tEUR/empl.) 𝑤𝐿 
Worldscope; Orbis; 
Annual reports 
242 57.69 21.53 12.07 141.01 
Price of natural gas (tEUR/GWh) 𝑤𝐹 OECD Observer 242 26.03 8.55 9.75 44.78 
Price of capital (%) 𝑤𝐶  
Worldscope; Orbis; 
Annual reports 
242 7.05 3.77 0.68 30.32 
Other control variables              
Share hydro capacity (%) ℎ𝑦𝑑 Platts PowerVision 242 28.28 26.63 0.00 100.00 
Share nuclear capacity (%) 𝑛𝑢𝑐 Platts PowerVision 242 11.77 17.10 0.00 61.46 
Binary indicator: generation only 𝛼𝐺  
 242 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Binary indicator: transmission only 𝛼𝑇    242 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Sources of vertical economies              
Binary indicator: registered patents 𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  Orbis 242 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Yearly time trend 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑   242 5.74 3.01 0.00 10.00 
Share of renewable energy supply 𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙  Eurostat 224 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.46 
Plant concentration index 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡  Platts PowerVision 242 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.25 
Firm concentration index 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚  Platts PowerVision 242 0.27 0.24 0.09 1.00 
Notes: Obs. refers to utility-year observations, S.D. is standard deviation, Min. is minimum, Max. is maximum, htEUR is hundred thousand (10^8) 
EUR, tEUR is thousand EUR, tKM is thousand Km, TWh is thousand GWh. 
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We employ the length of the transmission grid (in kilometers) as a measure of the transmission 
output. 23  This may seem controversial at first, but bears some advantages over a more 
conventional measure, such as transmitted volumes. Notably, the transmission grid is capital 
intensive and costs hardly change with variations in transmitted volumes, in particular in the 
short run. Thus, contrary to transmitted volumes, the length of the transmission grid may be 
more accurate in capturing capital expenditures. Moreover, the length of the grid (besides other 
factors such as topography or underground cabling) is crucial for maintenance expenditures and 
thus may have an influence on operating expenditures. Another argument for measuring the 
transmission output variable in kilometers (rather than in TWh) is based on the fact that 
transmitted volumes may not be under the immediate control of transmission grid operators, 
while the lengths of the transmission lines are. Because of the laws of physics, electricity cannot 
be easily transmitted directly from one location to another, but rather flows through its way of 
least resistance – often via detours (called loop flows 24) which are not subject to utilities’ 
influence. 
5.3. Input price variables 
Among the input-price variables, we include the price of labor, the price of capital, and the price 
of fuel. The price of labor is calculated as the expenses on salaries per year divided by the 
number of employees and, thus, represents the average expenses per employee per year. The 
data are obtained from Worldscope and are supplemented and, in case of doubtful values, 
verified by data from Orbis or annual reports. 
For the calculation of the price of capital we face one caveat. Generally, the annual rental rate 
of capital would represent a plausible measure. Nevertheless, we do not have such information 
for our sample. Therefore, we approximate this variable by the interest expenditures on long-
term debt relative to long-term debt. Evidently, long-term debt represents the most important 
source of funds for a capital intensive industry like electricity. 25  The data come from 
Worldscope and are backed by Orbis und annual reports. 
                                                          
23 In the fashion of Triebs et al. (2016), we chose a single output measure (because of multi-collinearity issues) for 
the downstream transmission stage among several possibilities, such as transmission grid length, transmitted 
volumes, or peak grid-load. 
24 In general, loop flows play a minor role in the distribution network. 
25 In a similar vein, Kaserman and Mayo (1991) employ the yield to maturity on long-term bonds as their price of 
capital, and Triebs et al. (2016) also concentrate on long-term interest rates for calculating capital expenditures. 
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The price of fossil fuel is approximated by the annual average national price of natural gas for 
industrial customers obtained from OECD.26 The utility’s respective gas price was taken from 
the country of its headquarter. This seems plausible because most utilities in the sample operate 
to a large scale at the national level. Similarly, other studies have included the price of fossil 
fuel, generally approximated by the price of natural gas (e.g. Martínez-Budría et al., 2003; Jara-
Díaz et al., 2004). Apart from fossil sources, other generation technologies, such as nuclear 
energy, water or other renewables, have very low or even zero fuel costs.27 
5.4. Control variables and identification 
We employ the share of hydro (ℎ𝑦𝑑) and the share of nuclear power (𝑛𝑢𝑐) in total installed 
capacity per utility obtained from Platts PowerVision, in order to control for different 
generation techniques. Hydro and nuclear power exhibit low marginal costs and are therefore 
likely to serve as cost shifters. We expect a negative impact on total costs. 
One decisive feature of this study is its sample of electricity utilities across European countries 
over time. Consequently, the panel structure allows employing fixed effects estimation in order 
to check for unobserved heterogeneity. Time fixed-effects are introduced to capture, for 
example, technological progress in the industry or other shocks such as demand variations (e.g. 
through the financial crisis) common to all utilities in the sample. We include country fixed-
effects to capture systematic time-invariant differences across the 16 countries due to, for 
example, different regulatory regimes, climate conditions, which may determine demand for 
electricity, topography, relevant for the costs of constructing and maintaining the transmission 
grid, or production possibilities (e.g. availability of rivers for hydro power plants).  
 Since a great share of variation in our sample is cross-sectional this may preclude 
identifying the EVI using within-utility variation. Therefore, our strategy to arrive at a credible 
(cross-sectional) identification strategy is threefold. First, we try to control for a lot of possible 
confounding factors (input prices; share of hydro; share of nuclear; time-fixed effects; country 
fixed effects). In that respect, we view the 16 country fixed effects for 28 firms particularly 
relevant to control for confounding effects. Second, we estimate a full specification of the cost 
function (including interaction terms between outputs and input prices), again going a long way 
                                                          
26 Unfortunately, the gas price explicitly for electricity companies in the OECD database exhibited too many 
missing values and could therefore not be employed in this analysis. However, both variables (i.e. the gas price 
for industrial customers and for electricity companies) reveal a high correlation of 0.998. 
27 The OECD Observer states that “unlike for coal, oil and gas, the impact on final prices of nuclear energy is very 
limited because fuel costs account for only 5% of the production cost.”  (OECD Observer No. 249, May 2005, 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/1595/Uranium_price_hike_.html, accessed 11 June, 
2014). 
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towards eliminating confounding effects. Finally, in section 7 we look at the sources of vertical 
economies including double interaction terms (with patents, a time trend, share of renewables 
and HHI). 
5.5. General data issues 
Financial variables, such as the total costs, salaries, or debt are obtained either from Worldscope 
for utilities listed on a stock exchange or from Orbis if not listed. Both sources provide data at 
the firm level. Accordingly, all global activities are captured if a firm operates overseas. This 
bears problems, since our output variables are measured at the European level.28 For those 
utilities it was necessary to adjust their financial variables to European activities. Hence, we 
calculated the annual share of sales in Europe in total (global) sales for each firm that operated 
overseas and adjusted the financial variables accordingly. 
Another data issue concerns the product mix of our sample utilities. Many electricity companies 
do not only provide a single product (electricity) but also engage in other production segments, 
foremost gas (but also water, waste, etc.). In order to limit our study to the analysis of electricity, 
it was necessary to adjust for firms’ operations apart from electricity. Henceforth, we calculated 
the share of revenues from electricity in total revenues (i.e. revenues generated from the whole 
product mix)29 and proportionally adjusted all financial variables based on the share of revenues 
from electricity. Worldscope and Orbis provide their financial data on various operational 
segments (e.g. electricity). Moreover we checked for robustness with information from annual 
reports (and other external sources) when data were available. 
 
6. Results 
This section provides regression estimates of the quadratic cost function as presented in 
Equations (3) and (4). We utilize these estimates to quantify potential cost savings from vertical 
synergies between the stages of generation and transmission. Different specifications of the 
model are chosen and discussed against their appropriateness. 
 
 
                                                          
28 Of course, this is equal to the national level for utilities operating only within one country. 
29 On average, the share of revenues from electricity in total revenues is 89.3%. 
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6.1. Cost function estimates 
As presented in section 4, we impose linear homogeneity of the cost function and divide the 
costs and input prices by the price of fuel. Moreover, we apply Sheppard’s Lemma to enhance 
estimation efficiency and estimate Equation (3) together with the cost share equations (4). In 
order to meet the non-linear characteristics of our cost function and its input shares, we estimate 
a non-linear system of equations. Hence, contrary to many other studies which employ a linear 
estimator of the cost function, we apply non-linear GLS estimation (NLSUR), “which is the 
non-linear counterpart of the Zellner’s iterated seemingly unrelated regression technique” 
(Fraquelli et al., 2005, 298). 
As stated in the previous section, a particular feature of this analysis is the possibility of 
estimating a panel regression with fixed effects.30 Because of the above reasoning, we apply 16 
country specific fixed effects and 11 year fixed effects, which may capture unobserved regional 
(e.g. regulatory regimes, topography, production possibilities) and temporal heterogeneity (e.g. 
technological progress, demand shocks). 
Table 2 shows the regression results from different model specifications. The basic model 
(Model i) excludes fixed effects, while alternative specifications introduce time fixed effects 
(Model ii) and country fixed effects (Model iii). Both time and country fixed effects are 
included in Model (iv). 31  All regressions are estimated with robust clustered (by utility) 
standard errors. Evidently, the regression estimates are robust to different specifications.32 
Most importantly, the coefficient estimate on the output interaction term 𝛽𝐺𝑇 is negative and 
statistically significant across specifications and its magnitude remains quantitatively similar 
across the columns. Since, the output interaction term measures cost savings based on the 
respective output combinations of generation and transmission, it is of relevance for variable 
EVI. On the other hand, the parameters 𝛼0, 𝛼𝐺 , and 𝛼𝑇 measure the fixed costs associated with 
vertical integration, stand-alone generation, and stand-alone transmission, respectively, which 
are independent of the magnitude of the outputs produced. For an integrated utility 𝛼0 occurs 
only once, but these fixed costs would be duplicated in case of separated production (which 
applies to unbundled utilities).  
                                                          
30 We refer to Greene (2001), who states that fixed-effects estimation with non-linear models is feasible. 
31 The coefficient estimates of the fixed effects are not reported but available upon request. 
32 Table A2 provides robustness estimates based on OLS and linear SUR, which underline the appropriateness of 
our non-linear SUR results. 
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Table 2. Non-linear regression (NLSUR) estimates of the cost function 
    (i) Basic model (ii) Time FE (iii) Country FE (iv) Time & Country FE 
𝐺 & 𝑇  𝛼0 0.5852 (0.386)  0.9311 (0.459) ** 1.0088 (0.731)  0.8026 (0.700)  
𝐺 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦  𝛼𝐺 -0.1055 (0.342)  0.0385 (0.384)  -0.2736 (0.362)  -0.0071 (0.394)  
𝑇 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦  𝛼𝑇 2.2536 (0.747) *** 2.2903 (0.759) *** 3.3830 (0.744) *** 3.2382 (0.726) *** 
𝑌𝐺  𝛽𝐺 0.0351 (0.011) *** 0.0333 (0.012) *** 0.0596 (0.014) *** 0.0585 (0.013) *** 
𝑌𝑇  𝛽𝑇 -0.1502 (0.059) *** -0.1427 (0.059) ** -0.1318 (0.053) ** -0.1066 (0.055) * 
0.5𝑌𝐺𝑌𝐺  𝛽𝐺𝐺 0.0001 (0.000)  0.0002 (0.000)  0.0000 (0.000)  0.0000 (0.000)  
0.5𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑇  𝛽𝑇𝑇 0.0041 (0.002) ** 0.0038 (0.002) * 0.0021 (0.002)  0.0014 (0.002)  
𝑌𝐺𝑌𝑇  𝛽𝐺𝑇 -0.0006 (0.000) * -0.0007 (0.000) * -0.0007 (0.000) ** -0.0008 (0.000) ** 
𝑃𝐿  𝛾𝑙 0.1789 (0.039) *** 0.1858 (0.040) *** 0.1679 (0.040) *** 0.1760 (0.041) *** 
𝑃𝐶  𝛾𝑐 0.3116 (0.033) *** 0.3230 (0.034) *** 0.3092 (0.039) *** 0.3189 (0.042) *** 
0.5𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐿  𝛾𝑙𝑙 -0.0078 (0.015)  -0.0110 (0.016)  -0.0045 (0.015)  -0.0085 (0.016)  
0.5𝑃𝐶𝑃𝐶  𝛾𝑐𝑐 -0.1309 (0.046) *** -0.1308 (0.048) *** -0.1407 (0.049) *** -0.1354 (0.050) *** 
𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐶  𝛾𝑙𝑐 -0.0161 (0.007) ** -0.0211 (0.006) *** -0.0140 (0.008) * -0.0191 (0.008) ** 
𝑌𝐺𝑃𝐿  𝛿𝐺𝑙 0.0000 (0.000)  0.0000 (0.000)  0.0000 (0.000)  0.0000 (0.000)  
𝑌𝐺𝑃𝐶  𝛿𝐺𝑐 -0.0007 (0.000) *** -0.0007 (0.000) *** -0.0006 (0.000) *** -0.0006 (0.000) *** 
𝑌𝑇𝑃𝐿  𝛿𝑇𝑙 0.0006 (0.001)  0.0006 (0.001)  0.0006 (0.001)  0.0005 (0.001)  
𝑌𝑇𝑃𝐶  𝛿𝑇𝑐 0.0042 (0.001) *** 0.0042 (0.001) *** 0.0041 (0.001) *** 0.0042 (0.001) *** 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 ℎ𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜 𝑐𝑎𝑝. ℎ𝑦𝑑 -0.0080 (0.005)  -0.0067 (0.005)  -0.0147 (0.012)  -0.0100 (0.013)  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝. 𝑛𝑢𝑐 -0.0063 (0.009)   -0.0053 (0.010)   0.0260 (0.029)   0.0252 (0.030)   
Time FE  no   yes   no   yes   
Country FE   no     no     yes     yes     
Obs.  242   242   242   242   
Overall R2   0.883     0.891     0.928     0.936     
Notes: Dependent variable is total expenditures excluding purchased power; Robust clustered (by utility) standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Across specifications, 𝛼0 is statistically insignificant (except for model ii) indicating negligible 
fixed cost savings of vertical integration. However, their magnitude has to be calculated 
according to Equation 2 based on the estimates from the cost function, as shown in section 6.2. 
Moreover, 𝛼𝐺  is statistically insignificant throughout, which implies that stand-alone 
generation is not associated with additional fixed costs compared to vertical integration. On the 
contrary, the positive and significant coefficient value of 𝛼𝑇 indicates additional fixed-costs 
increases for stand-alone transmitters. 
Although not explicitly shown in Table 2, the coefficient estimates of the time fixed effects are 
largely insignificant, with the exception of significantly negative impacts in the years 2006 and 
2007. In contrast, most country fixed effects (10 out of 16 in Model iv) enter statistically 
significant. There seems to be significant heterogeneity across European countries with respect 
to the costs of supplying electricity. 
6.2.Economies of vertical integration (EVI) 
The quantification of vertical economies follows Equation (2) and is based on estimates from 
the cost function. Economies of vertical integration reflect the cost savings of joint operation 
of electricity generation and transmission versus stand-alone operations. Specifically, we 
calculate the cost savings from joint operation at median and mean output combinations for 
integrated utilities (reflecting firm size). Given a skewed distribution, there is a great difference 
between the median and the mean. The median sized integrated firm produces 45.5 TWh 
electricity and possesses 5,500 km of transmission lines, the mean refers to 117.5 TWh and 
14,700 km. Independent variables (input prices and control variables) are evaluated at their 
mean values. To obtain significance levels, we test Equation (2) against zero based on a non-
linear Wald test.33 
Table 3 reports the magnitude of vertical synergies at median and mean output levels according 
to equation (2) based on the estimates of various specifications of the cost function (as shown 
in Table 2). Moreover, the overall EVI are decomposed into their fixed and variable 
components. Overall EVI for the median and mean sized integrated firm are economically and 
statistically significant across specifications. Only for the case of median EVI based on model 
                                                          
33 We use STATA’s command testnl. The chi-squared values are based on the Delta-Method, which requires a 
large sample. Alternatively, we apply a linear test of Equation (1) against zero using STATA’s command lincom. 
The significance levels hardly change. 
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iv (time and country fixed effects), results are close to conventional statistical significance (p-
value = 0.13, i.e. statistical significance with a probability of 87%). 
 
Table 3. Median and mean economies of vertical integration (EVI) for integrated utilities 
  (i) Basic model (ii) Time FE (iii) Country FE (iv) Time & Country FE 
Median EVI 17.1%* 21.2%** 16.7%* 14.4% 
 (3.00) (6.08) (3.03) (2.28) 
… fixed EVI 13.6% 18.1%** 14.1% 11.6% 
 (2.22) (4.84) (2.50) (1.65) 
… variable EVI 3.5%* 3.2%* 2.6%*** 2.8%*** 
 (2.86) (2.81) (9.85) (10.64)      
Mean EVI 24.2%** 27.1%** 22.1%** 21.0%** 
 (3.91) (5.91) (4.29) (4.28) 
… fixed EVI 8.8% 12.3%** 9.7% 7.8% 
 (2.10) (4.02) (2.13) (1.43) 
… variable EVI 15.5%* 14.8%* 12.3%*** 13.2%*** 
  (2.90) (3.00) (7.76) (8.57) 
Notes: EVIs are calculated for integrated utilities at the mean output combination (G=117.4 TWh, T=14.7 
tKm) and the median output combination (G=45.5 TWh, T=5.5 tKm). Fixed EVI relate to fixed cost savings, 
variable EVI to variable cost savings. Chi-squared values from a non-linear Wald test are given in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
In general, Table 3 confirms the presence of considerable vertical cost synergies for integrated 
European electricity utilities. Form our preferred specification (iv) including time and country 
fixed effects, we estimate vertical cost synergies for the median and mean sized utility of 14% 
and 21%, respectively, relative to stand-alone operations. Hence, the findings indicate that with 
larger output combinations, cost savings increase further. From this we argue that large 
integrated electricity operators may benefit from higher economies of vertical integration that 
would be lost with ownership unbundling. 
The decomposition of EVI into fixed and variable parts is interesting too. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on the output interaction term (𝛽𝐺𝑇) suggests strong evidence 
for the presence of variable cost synergies between the stages of generation and transmission 
(i.e. cost complementarity). Hence, with larger combinations of both outputs (i.e. larger amount 
of electricity generated and longer length of transmission grid lines), electricity utilities may be 
able to internalize negative market externalities through better coordination. Variable cost 
synergies are therefore dependent on the magnitude of the two outputs. This is an explanation, 
why variable EVI make up a relatively larger proportion of the mean sized integrated utility 
compared to the relatively smaller median sized utility.  
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Conversely, fixed EVI are independent of the magnitude of the output level. Fixed costs of joint 
production would be duplicated in case of vertical separation. However, with increasing scale 
(i.e. larger output combination) fixed EVI lose in importance relative to variable EVI. 
Moreover, while the constant on stand-alone generation (𝛼𝐺) is statistically insignificant (see 
Table 2), the constant on stand-alone transmission (𝛼𝑇 ) is positive and significant. Hence, 
evidence points to additional fixed costs for transmission companies (in addition to the 
duplication of overall fixed costs), whereas there are no additional fixed costs for stand-alone 
generators. 
From these findings we can derive important policy implications. The regulatory principle of 
ownership unbundling of the transmission grid comes at substantial costs due to lost vertical 
synergies. This finding holds especially true for large scale integrated electricity utilities which 
may obtain cost advantages of beyond 20 percent. Hence, countries with large vertically 
integrated electricity utilities prior to the implementation of ownership unbundling may suffer 
the most from vertical divestiture. These countries may face severe barriers when introducing 
transmission unbundling, as such a policy requires its associated benefits (such as increased 
competition, lower end-consumer prices, etc.) to exceed the associated lost vertical cost 
synergies. On the contrary, countries with relatively small electricity companies may obtain 
economic benefits, such as non-discriminatory price competition in the upstream stage of 
generation, by introducing full ownership unbundling, while the associated losses from vertical 
economies may be of lesser importance.34 
 
7.  Sources of vertical economies 
So far, the analysis has provided evidence for the existence of scope economies of around 14 
percent for the median integrated firm. For large scale integrated electricity utilities there is 
even scope for greater cost synergies from vertical integration. This section tries to evaluate 
empirically where economies of vertical integration may stem from. Besides other potential 
influential factors, we specifically concentrate on two sources of vertical economies in this 
empirical investigation: (i) There may exist vertical economies from the presence of asset 
specificity. (ii) There may be high market complexity among the supply stages of generation 
                                                          
34 In this context, Meyer (2012b, 168) stresses that the actual degree of lost cost synergies from vertical divestiture 
largely hinges on the effectiveness of a newly created market mechanism that may overtake “firm internal 
coordination.” However, we cannot empirically test for this hypothesis. 
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and transmission, which may require coordination that an integrated utility can meet at lower 
costs than leaving coordination to the market. 
For both potential explanations for the presence of economies of vertical integration we 
estimate the cost function as presented in equation (2), yet include an additional parameter (𝜃) 
on the output interaction term multiplied by the additional variable of interest: 𝜃 ∗ 𝑌𝐺𝑌𝑇𝑍, where 
Z may represent a proxy for asset specificity or market complexity. If 𝜃  was found to be 
negative and significant, this would be an indication that vertical integration is cost-beneficial 
compared to stand-alone operations in order to deal with either asset specificity or market 
complexity. In other words, we test for variation in scope economies with different proxies for 
complexity and asset specificity.35 
7.1. Asset specificity 
Vertical economies may arise from asset specificity (e.g. Williamson, 1971) in the electricity 
industry. As noted earlier, the electricity industry is highly complex with specific network 
characteristics (supply has to meet demand at all times, electricity flows follow physical laws) 
and requires intensive coordination among the supply stages. Moreover, investments in 
electricity generation (e.g. building a new power plant) and/or transmission (e.g. extension of 
the existing grid) are generally associated with sunk costs since their associated value for 
alternative use is low. At both stages of supply, investments in new power plants or in the 
transmission grid have no alternative usage other than power generation or power transportation 
(‘site specificity’), are immobile and constructed to operate long-term (‘physical asset 
specificity’), and require specialized human capital, such as plant operators or engineers 
(‘human asset specificity’) (Joskow, 2005b). Given their asset specificity, investments in the 
electricity industry are risky, and hence the ‘hold-up risk’ of electricity utilities may be 
minimized by vertical integration (Meyer, 2012b). 
A general proxy for asset specificity in any industry is technological intensity. In this sense, 
Acemoglu et al. (2010) investigate the determinants of vertical integration and find that vertical 
integration is more likely when the (producing) industry has a higher share of R&D 
expenditures in value added. Unfortunately, data on R&D expenditures at the firm level 
provided by Worldscope Datastream exhibit many missing values and generally show little 
                                                          
35 In this respect, Forbes and Lederman (2009) focus on vertical integration in the US airline industry, where high 
market complexity may lead to costly ex-post adaptations and renegotiations with subcontractors. Moreover, the 
authors provide a short overview about studies that investigate the relationship between asset specificity and 
vertical integration, which generally find a positive relationship (i.e. asset specificity is associated with higher 
vertical cost savings). 
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information. Therefore, we try to approximate technological intensity by patent data. We utilize 
firm-level data on patents from Orbis to create a binary indicator (𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) which is equal 
to one if a firm has engaged in research (has registered patents) over the sample period 2000–
2010 and zero otherwise. Although this is just a crude measure for technological intensity, we 
believe that it provides at least some discrimination between technologically more intense firms 
and others. 
7.2. Coordination requirements from market complexity 
Over the past two decades, electricity markets have had to deal with several influences for 
which the network as well as the power plants were initially not designed for. This, in turn, 
intensified the complexity of electricity markets and the corresponding coordination 
requirements over time. For instance, the increased share of vastly intermittent renewables at 
guaranteed feed-in tariffs have led to market distortions (e.g. replacement of conventional gas 
and oil plants) and boosted the number of plant dispatches. Moreover, market entry has occurred 
due to market liberalization policies. In addition, subsidized provision of decentralized 
(renewable) electricity generation and market coupling have exacerbated complexity in recent 
years. From this we assume that the multiplication of a time trend over the sample horizon 
2000–2010 ( 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ) by the output interaction term may reveal increased coordination 
requirements over time. 
We further investigate the topic of complexity and focus on renewable energy sources. 
Renewables tend to enhance coordination needs of the electricity system because wind and solar 
represent decentralized intermittent sources, often at guaranteed feed-in so that they usually 
generate whenever possible. Hence, when the wind is blowing and/or the sun is shining, other 
conventional plants (foremost gas and oil) are replaced by renewables. Based on data from 
Eurostat we calculate countries’ shares of renewable energy in thousand tons of oil equivalent 
(tTOE) in total energy supply in tTOE over time (𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙)36. Therefore, we assume that in 
countries with increased energy supply from renewable sources, coordination requirements rise. 
Coordination requirements may also arise at markets that exhibit a low level of market 
concentration. We are able to measure market concentration either at the firm level or power 
plant level. We believe that countries with low levels of concentration are associated with 
higher coordination requirements, since markets become more complex. In contrast, a high 
                                                          
36 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (accessed 17 December, 2014). Please note that Switzerland is 
not included in Eurostat’s database, which results in the loss of 18 observations. 
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level of plant or firm concentration may lower coordination needs because there is less 
complexity. 
Therefore, we calculate Herfindahl-Hischman-Indices (HHI) from data on power plants’ 
installed capacity obtained from Platts PowerVision. The database provides information about 
installed capacity of virtually all firms and all power plants of European countries. Hence, we 
are able to calculate both, plants’ and utilities’ capacity shares relative to total national installed 
capacity. Eventually, this yields HHI concentration metrics at the plant level (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡) and at 
the firm level (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚) for each sample utility in its respective country (i.e. headquarter 
location). HHI specifically calculates the sum of all plants’ or firms’ squared capacity shares 
by country. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡  represents a country’s sum of squared shares of individual plants’ 
installed capacities relative to national total installed capacity per year: 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐,𝑡
𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑝
2𝑁
𝑝=1 , 
𝑎𝑝 =
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝,𝑐,𝑡
∑ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝,𝑐,𝑡
𝑁
𝑝=1
, where the subscripts p, c, and t stand for plant, country, and year, 
respectively. 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚  calculates accordingly: 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑐,𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝑎𝑖 =
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
∑ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
, 
where i denotes the firm. Note that HHI varies between zero and one, where a value of one 
represents maximum concentration – one plant or one firm owns the entire installed generation 
capacity in a country. In order to induce the same economic interpretation of the 𝜃-coefficient 
as above, we subtract HHI from one and multiply it by the output interaction term. Hence 𝜃 
measures the impact of 𝑌𝐺𝑌𝑇(1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼) on total costs. A low level of concentration (i.e. a high 
value of (1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼)) may increase the coordination needs of power plants or utilities as the 
market becomes more complex. A negative coefficient estimate therefore indicates that market 
complexity from lower plant or firm concentration leads to cost savings from vertical 
integration. 
7.3. Results 
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics of the variables used to measure either asset 
specificity (𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) or complexity (𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙, 1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡, 1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚). Each of 
these variables now enters the econometric estimation of the cost function as a double 
interaction with the output interaction term. If negative and statistically significant, its 
coefficient (𝜃 ) indicates cost synergies from vertical integration either in the presence of 
registered patents, in more recent years, when a country has low power-plant or utility 
concentration, or when the share of renewables is high. 
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Table 4. Non-linear regression (NLSUR) estimates of the cost function including a double interaction term 
  (i) d_patents (ii) Trend (iii) Renewables share (iv) (1-HHI
plant) (v) (1-HHIfirm) 
𝐺 & 𝑇  𝛼0 0.5609 (0.381)  0.8214 (0.187) *** 0.7674 (0.390) ** 0.7738 (0.380) ** 0.8807 (0.385) ** 
𝐺 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦  𝛼𝐺 -0.0184 (0.381)  -0.3022 (0.183) * -0.6082 (0.350) * -0.2125 (0.367)  -0.4545 (0.329)  
𝑇 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦  𝛼𝑇 3.0887 (0.883) *** 2.5536 (0.410) *** 2.8827 (0.797) *** 2.4484 (0.762) *** 2.4470 (0.733) *** 
𝑌𝐺  𝛽𝐺  0.0303 (0.011) *** 0.0402 (0.005) *** 0.0517 (0.011) *** 0.0367 (0.014) *** 0.0437 (0.012) *** 
𝑌𝑇  𝛽𝑇 -0.1931 (0.070) *** -0.1770 (0.034) *** -0.1998 (0.070) *** -0.1614 (0.061) *** -0.1714 (0.063) *** 
0.5𝑌𝐺𝑌𝐺  𝛽𝐺𝐺  0.0002 (0.000) * 0.0001 (0.000)  0.0000 (0.000)  0.0001 (0.000)  0.0001 (0.000)  
0.5𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑇  𝛽𝑇𝑇 0.0053 (0.002) ** 0.0051 (0.001) *** 0.0057 (0.003) ** 0.0045 (0.002) ** 0.0049 (0.002) ** 
𝑌𝐺𝑌𝑇  𝛽𝐺𝑇 0.0026 (0.001) * -0.0004 (0.000) * 0.0001 (0.001)  0.0104 (0.008)  -0.0003 (0.000)  
𝑌𝐺𝑌𝑇𝑍  𝜃  -0.0034 (0.002) ** -9.94E-06 (0.000) ** -0.0057 (0.002) *** -0.0112 (0.008)  -0.0006 (0.000) *** 
𝑃𝐿  𝛾𝑙 0.1693 (0.023) *** 0.1703 (0.016) *** 0.1674 (0.026) *** 0.1698 (0.023) *** 0.1703 (0.023) *** 
𝑃𝐶  𝛾𝑐 0.2715 (0.032) *** 0.2742 (0.019) *** 0.2950 (0.034) *** 0.2725 (0.032) *** 0.2741 (0.032) *** 
0.5𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐿  𝛾𝑙𝑙 -0.1044 (0.109)  -0.1089 (0.075)  -0.1071 (0.115)  -0.1066 (0.109)  -0.1098 (0.109)  
0.5𝑃𝐶𝑃𝐶  𝛾𝑐𝑐 -1.2488 (0.832)  -1.2398 (0.567) ** -1.5730 (0.861) * -1.2304 (0.829)  -1.2488 (0.831)  
𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐶  𝛾𝑙𝑐 -0.1598 (0.204)  -0.1840 (0.121)  -0.1958 (0.211)  -0.1710 (0.201)  -0.1818 (0.200)  
𝑌𝐺𝑃𝐿  𝛿𝐺𝑙 0.0000 (0.000)  0.0000 (0.000)  0.0000 (0.000)  0.0000 (0.000)  0.0000 (0.000)  
𝑌𝐺𝑃𝐶  𝛿𝐺𝑐 -0.0007 (0.000) *** -0.0007 (0.000) *** -0.0007 (0.000) *** -0.0007 (0.000) *** -0.0007 (0.000) *** 
𝑌𝑇𝑃𝐿  𝛿𝑇𝑙 0.0007 (0.001)  0.0007 (0.000) * 0.0007 (0.001)  0.0007 (0.001)  0.0007 (0.001)  
𝑌𝑇𝑃𝐶  𝛿𝑇𝑐 0.0043 (0.001) *** 0.0044 (0.001) *** 0.0043 (0.001) *** 0.0043 (0.001) *** 0.0043 (0.001) *** 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 ℎ𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜 ℎ𝑦𝑑 -0.0052 (0.005)  -0.0069 (0.003) ** -0.0043 (0.009)  -0.0066 (0.006)  -0.0082 (0.006)  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑛𝑢𝑐 0.0031 (0.009)  -0.0081 (0.006)  -0.0126 (0.011)  -0.0062 (0.010)  -0.0107 (0.010)  
Obs.   242     242     224     242     242     
Overall R2  0.887   0.887   0.894   0.889   0.889   
Median EVI 
d_patents=0: 10.0% year=2000: 16.6%*** Rnwbl=0.01: 14.7%* (1-HHIp)=0.75: 15.2%* (1-HHIf)=0.00: 17.8%** 
  Rnwbl=0.11: 14.9%* (1-HHI
p)=0.97: 16.2%** (1-HHIf)=0.73: 18.0%** 
d_patents=1: 11.4% year=2010: 16.6%*** Rnwbl=0.46: 15.7%** (1-HHIp)=0.99: 16.3%** (1-HHIf)=0.91: 18.1%** 
Mean EVI 
d_patents=0: -24.4% year=2000: 19.9%*** Rnwbl=0.01: 12.1% (1-HHIp)=0.75: -12.3% (1-HHIf)=0.00: 19.5%** 
  Rnwbl=0.11: 19.4%* (1-HHI
p)=0.97: 20.7%** (1-HHIf)=0.73: 25.1%*** 
d_patents=1: 21.5%** year=2010: 21.2%*** Rnwbl=0.46: 43.7%*** (1-HHIp)=0.99: 23.3%** (1-HHIf)=0.91: 26.4%*** 
Notes: Dependent variable is total expenditures excluding purchased power; EVIs are calculated for integrated utilities at the mean output combination (G=117.4 TWh, 
T=14.7 tkm) and the median output combination (G=45.5 TWh, T=5.5 tkm). Robust and clustered (by utility) standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 4 reports the regression estimates of the cost function, as introduced in Equations (3) and 
(4), but expanded by an additional double interaction term of the output interaction term 
multiplied by the additional variable of interest, 𝑌𝐺𝑌𝑇𝑍. Z represents a measure for complexity 
or asset specificity (𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 , 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 , 𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙 , 1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡 , 1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 ) as indicated 
above and 𝜃 represents its coefficient. Indeed, the coefficient estimates of 𝜃 are negative across 
model specifications. This is an indication that asset specificity and market complexity indeed 
lead to cost advantages from vertical integration. Moreover, Table 4 includes EVI estimates for 
an integrated firm’s median and mean output combinations evaluated at various levels of the 
variables measuring asset specificity and market complexity. The EVI metrics presented here 
support the robustness of the main findings presented above. 
Specification (i) tests for technological intensity and includes a binary indicator for registered 
patents multiplied by the output interaction term. The negative and significant estimate of 𝜃 
implies vertical cost synergies for utilities that engage in research (have registered patents). We 
infer that this corroborates our assumption that electricity utilities may overcome problems 
associated with asset specificity by vertical integration. The mean integrated patenting utility 
observes more than 20% EVI, while the non-patenting integrated utility even shows 
diseconomies of vertical integration, albeit insignificant. 
Specification (ii) includes a time trend in the double interaction term to test for increased market 
complexity. 𝜃 becomes negative and significant. This means that as a consequence of increased 
complexity of electricity markets over time, utilities benefit from vertical integration. 
Specification (iii) addresses this issue in more detail by focusing on the countries’ shares of 
renewable energy. Again, 𝜃  becomes significantly negative. Hence, an increasing share of 
renewable energy in total energy supply seems to intensify the complexity of the electricity 
system. In order to manage the coordination requirements associated with increased 
complexity, electricity utilities seem to benefit from vertical integration. If a country moves 
from the minimum of 1% renewable share to the maximum of 46%, EVI increase from 12.1% 
to 43.7% for the mean integrated utility. 
Specification (iv) addresses the issue of power plant concentration. The negative (though 
insignificant) coefficient of 𝜃  suggests that with lower plant concentration (i.e. higher 
complexity), vertical integration results in lower costs.37 In other words, utilities can save on 
                                                          
37 Lower plant concentration decreases the HHI, so that (1-HHI) increases. This implies that a negative estimate 
of ?̂? corresponds with cost savings from lower plant concentration. 
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costs by being vertically integrated when the market becomes more complex due to lower plant 
concentration. 
In addition to measuring concentration at the plant level, we calculate HHIs at the utility level, 
as presented in specification (v). 38  One would assume that lower concentration among 
electricity utilities’ generation capacity is associated with higher market complexity. Indeed, 𝜃 
turns out negative and significant, indicating cost savings from vertical integration. If a country 
moves from a monopoly situation (minimum of (1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚) = 0) to a fairly unconcentrated 
situation (maximum of (1 − 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚) = 0.91), EVI increase from 19.5% to 26.4% for the 
mean integrated utility. For example, Latvia and France are both highly concentrated with HHIs 
around 0.9 in 2010. EVIs of integrated utilities in such highly concentrated markets are 
estimated at 18.1% for the mean size. In contrast, Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom 
exhibit low levels of market concentration with HHIs around 0.1 in 2010. EVI for the mean 
sized integrated utility are 26.4% in this case. In general, this points to substantial economies 
of vertical integration. In particular, large scale operations seem to have even greater potential 
for EVI when market complexity is high (due to low degrees of integration). 
Altogether, there appears to be a vast potential for cost savings from vertical integration in the 
presence of either asset specificity or market complexity. In both cases, empirical evidence 
indicates that electricity utilities seem to overcome the resulting problems of intensified 
coordination requirements by vertical integration among the supply stages of generation and 
transmission. Large scale integrated utilities seem to have greater potential for cost savings 
from being vertically integrated. 
 
8. Conclusion and policy implications 
The EU has already put unbundling of the transmission grid from other stages of electricity 
supply into practice. Accordingly, Member States may choose between full ownership 
unbundling and the implementation of an ISO or ITO, where the first is the predominant form 
in Europe. The reason for transmission unbundling is the hope of increased competitive pressure 
in electricity generation, caused by a separation from the transmission stage, which is associated 
                                                          
38 In a similar vein, the Energy Charter Secretariat (2003) calculates firms’ concentration based on their installed 
capacities. 
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with a natural monopoly. However, the potentially positive effects of transmission unbundling 
may be compensated or even offset by lost synergy effects.  
The policy debate on transmission unbundling generally neglects the fact that the benefits of 
increased competition in the upstream stage of generation in the electricity sector come at the 
cost of destructing vertical synergies. One reason may be the absence of thorough empirical 
evidence for Europe. From this point, this analysis is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to 
provide European cross-country evidence on the costs of ownership unbundling of the 
transmission grid. 
Cost savings from vertical integration of generation and transmission are likely to arise from 
various effects. Among them are the common usage of inputs, such as capital and labor. 
Besides, sharing of information and risk, internalization of externalities, and coordination 
advantages are reasonable explanations for cost savings. Hence, ownership unbundling of the 
transmission grid may result in significantly higher costs for electricity utilities. 
This study implements novel firm-level data on 28 major European electricity utilities from 16 
European countries over the period 2000–2010. Data emanate from annual reports as well as 
Worldscope Datastream, Orbis, Platts PowerVision, Eurostat, and OECD. Based on the 
empirical estimation of a quadratic cost function, we quantify vertical economies of scope. 
Contrary to many other related studies, we introduce a fully specified cost function (including 
a full set of output and input price interaction terms) together with its input share equations 
(Sheppard’s Lemma) and all standard assumptions (i.e. linear homogeneity in input prices and 
symmetry in parameters). In order to meet the non-linearity characteristics of the system of 
equations, we apply a non-linear GLS estimator (NLSUR). One decisive feature of this paper 
is the possibility to account for unobserved heterogeneity through time and country fixed-
effects. 
Our results confirm that there are substantial scope economies between the stages of upstream 
generation and downstream transmission in Europe. For the median integrated utility in our 
sample, we find cost savings from vertical integration of around 14 percent. Higher cost savings 
may be achieved with increased firm size. Large scale utilities may decrease total costs by more 
than 20 percent from vertical integration. This scale effect is explained by severe variable cost 
synergies, which are found to be economically and statistically significant across specifications. 
Overall, the results are robust to various specifications.  
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Moreover, we subject potential sources of vertical cost synergies to empirical scrutiny. Both, 
asset specificity of investments in the electricity sector and high market complexity would 
represent potential sources of vertical synergies that may be addressed by vertical integration. 
We apply a crude measure of registered patents for technological intensity, which is generally 
used to approximate asset specificity. Evidence shows that electricity utilities overcome the 
hold-up risk associated with asset specificity by vertical integration. Market complexity is 
measured by four alternating variables: A time trend captures, among other factors, increased 
complexity through electricity production from renewables and market coupling; The share of 
renewable energy in total energy supply may explicitly measure complexity through 
renewables’ intermittent nature; A power plant concentration index may directly measure 
coordination requirements; In a similar vein, a firm concentration index captures coordination 
needs. Evidence shows that vertical integration is cost-beneficial when market complexity is 
intensified, as coordination requirements can be met easier. Moreover, EVI estimates show that 
large-scale utilities have greater potential for cost savings from vertical integration. 
One should keep in mind, however, that this analysis has a rather static focus because the data 
at hand do not allow for a proficient analysis of dynamic effects. Over time, cost increases may 
be partly compensated by positive dynamic effects of unbundling.39 Besides, the estimated 
additional costs of ownership unbundling through lost vertical synergies cannot be easily 
compared with the benefits of increased competition. Yet, this analysis represents an important 
contribution to the literature and the general debate on unbundling as it provides evidence that 
transmission ownership unbundling comes at a cost.  
Our findings thus call for special caution when arguing about policies furthering unbundling 
policies in the European Union. In order to overcome efficiency losses from unbundling, market 
forces may be fostered. From our analysis, it seems that policies that allow for the 
internalization of externalities from asset specificity and market complexity may be desirable. 
Particularly, such policies may concentrate on lowering the hold-up risk of sunk costs and 
enhancing the integration of renewable sources of energy. Moreover, a high quality of market 
institutions is necessary to meet the inherent coordination needs among the different electricity 
supply stages.  
                                                          
39 Schober (2013) provides a comparison of static versus dynamic effects of distribution unbundling. He finds that 
negative static effects from ownership unbundling and third party access are eventually offset by positive dynamic 
effects. 
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In sum, the evidence from this analysis aids our understanding of the cost effects of transmission 
unbundling in electricity. From a policy perspective, a successful unbundling regime would at 
least require that the benefits of increased competition in power generation would offset the 
associated efficiency losses from vertical divestiture. Fourteen percent for the median and more 
than twenty percent for the mean firm therefore represent non-negligible hurdles. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Sample of electricity utilities 
Utility Country Obs. Period   
Organizational 
structure 
EVN Austria 11 2000-2010  G 
Verbund Austria 11 2000-2010  G&T 
Wiener Stadtwerke Austria 3 2008-2010  G 
CEZ Group Czech Rep. 11 2000-2010  G&T until 2002, then G 
Fortum Finland 10 2001-2010  G 
EDF France 11 2000-2010  G&T 
ENBW Germany 10 2001-2010  G&T 
RWE Germany 11 2000-2010  G&T 
Public Power Corp. Greece 11 2000-2010  G&T 
Magyar Villamos Hungary 7 2003-2010  G&T 
A2A Italy 7 2004-2010  G 
Acea Italy 11 2000-2010  G&T until 2005, then G 
Enel Italy 6 2005-2010  G 
IREN Italy 11 2000-2010  G&T 
Terna Italy 10 2001-2010  T 
Latvenergo Latvia 5 2006-2010  G&T 
Statkraft Norway 5 2006-2010  G 
Enea Poland 3 2008-2010  G 
PGE Polska Grupa Poland 3 2008-2010  G 
EDP Portugal 10 2001-2010  G&T 
Endesa Spain 11 2000-2010  G 
Iberdrola Spain 9 2002-2010  G 
Red Electrica Spain 8 2003-2010  T 
Vattenfall Sweden 10 2001-2010  G&T until 2009, then G 
BKW Switzerland 11 2000-2010  G&T 
Energiedienst Switzerland 7 2004-2010  G&T 
Drax Group United Kingdom 8 2003-2010  G 
National Grid United Kingdom 11 2000-2010   T 
Total   242    
Notes: Obs. Is observations; G&T represents an integrated utility, G is stand-alone generation, T is 
stand-alone transmission. 
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Table A2. Robustness: linear regression estimates 
    (A1) OLS (A2) Linear SUR 
𝐺 & 𝑇  𝛼0 0.640 (0.434)  0.570 (0.352)  
𝐺 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦  𝛼𝐺 -0.211 (0.305)  -0.311 (0.285)  
𝑇 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦  𝛼𝑇 3.079 (0.618) *** 2.746 (0.565) *** 
𝑌𝐺  𝛽𝐺 0.034 (0.006) *** 0.035 (0.005) *** 
𝑌𝑇  𝛽𝑇 -0.184 (0.044) *** -0.175 (0.040) *** 
0.5𝑌𝐺𝑌𝐺  𝛽𝐺𝐺 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) * 
0.5𝑌𝑇𝑌𝑇  𝛽𝑇𝑇 0.005 (0.001) *** 0.005 (0.001) *** 
𝑌𝐺𝑌𝑇  𝛽𝐺𝑇 -0.001 (0.000) *** -0.001 (0.000) *** 
𝑃𝐿  𝛾𝑙 0.067 (0.172)  -0.007 (0.107)  
𝑃𝐶  𝛾𝑐 -1.305 (0.979)  -0.416 (0.458)  
0.5𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐿  𝛾𝑙𝑙 -14.366 (31.973)  -0.011 (0.008)  
0.5𝑃𝐶𝑃𝐶  𝛾𝑐𝑐 -23.485 (654.353)  -0.123 (0.045) *** 
𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐶  𝛾𝑙𝑐 57.022 (146.035)  -0.011 (0.034)  
𝑌𝐺𝑃𝐿  𝛿𝐺𝑙 0.054 (0.035)  0.070 (0.015) *** 
𝑌𝐺𝑃𝐶  𝛿𝐺𝑐 0.127 (0.175)  -0.001 (0.000) *** 
𝑌𝑇𝑃𝐿  𝛿𝑇𝑙 0.004 (0.191)  0.076 (0.081)  
𝑌𝑇𝑃𝐶  𝛿𝑇𝑐 0.271 (0.890)   0.004 (0.001) *** 
Obs.  242   242   
Adj. R2   0.889     0.895     
Median EVI  15.3%**   15.5%**   
Mean EVI  19.6%***   20.2%***   
Notes: Dependent variable is total expenditures excluding purchased power; EVIs are calculated for 
integrated utilities at the mean output combination (G=117.4 TWh, T=14.7 tkm) and the median 
output combination (G=45.5 TWh, T=5.5 tkm). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
